Posted:
July 3, 2010
By Tom Bethel
AMO National President
The ferocious flow of toxic crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico from the BP blowout has led to pointless debate over the Jones Act, the 1920 law that reserves all domestic waterborne cargoes for merchant vessels owned, built, flagged and crewed in the U.S.
What does the Jones Act have to do with the Gulf catastrophe? Nothing. But brazen opportunists in the U.S. and abroad see the crisis as an opening, a way to revive long-held hopes of eliminating the law -- in one legislative strike, if possible, or incrementally if necessary -- for narrow professional, financial, political or diplomatic gain. Like the oil surging relentlessly from the ruptured riser at the BP drill site, their message is spreading through inaccurate media reports and misleading commentary.
The issue is whether the Jones Act impedes the emergency response in the Gulf. Jones Act critics say there are too few domestic merchant vessels to do what is required on so large a scale. These critics contend as well that, because of the Jones Act, suitable foreign-flagged vessels offered for specific services are denied entry to the Gulf.
But the facts say that the Jones Act is no hindrance at all.
Under current interpretation of the law by its enforcement authority -- Customs and Border Protection in the Department of Homeland Security -- the Jones Act applies only within three miles of the Gulf coastline.
Jones Act vessels of varied size and configuration are helping to skim and contain the oil within this three-mile zone. "During the current situation in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S.-flagged vessels have been used in every situation where U.S. vessels and crews are available," Maritime Administrator David Matsuda noted June 17 in testimony before the House Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Subcommittee. "Seventy-seven percent of the vessels providing oil spill response in the Gulf are U.S.-flagged."
Waters beyond the three-mile coastal range under Jones Act jurisdiction are wide open -- and several foreign-flagged, built, owned and crewed vessels are providing cleanup and containment services closer to the BP drill site some 50 miles off the Louisiana coast. By July 1, the government had accepted assistance from 12 countries, and offers from a total of 30 countries were under consideration. "To be clear, the acceptance of international assistance we announced today did not mean to imply that international help was arriving only now," a State Department spokesman told reporters June 29. "In fact, before today, there were 24 foreign vessels operating in the region, and nine countries had provided boom, skimmers and other assistance."
While the law provides for Jones Act waivers under specific, orderly procedures when necessary in national emergencies, none of the foreign-flagged vessels underway in or en route to the Gulf were "waived" in by Customs and Border Protection because these vessels are or will be working outside the Jones Act's scope.
In mid-June, U.S. Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen (retired), head of the National Incident Command coordinating the spill response from Louisiana, said emphatically that no Jones Act waivers had been granted at that point because none had been requested. The NIC, he said, was prepared for "accelerated processing" of Jones Act waiver requests if such applications are filed.
"While we have not seen any need to waive the Jones Act as part of this historic response, we continue to prepare for all possible scenarios," Admiral Allen said later. "Should any waivers be needed, we are prepared to process them as quickly as possible to allow vital spill response activities being undertaken by foreign-flagged vessels to continue without delay."
A separate NIC statement said neither the NIC nor any other U.S. authority had "declined to request assistance or accept offers of assistance of foreign vessels that meet an operational need because the Jones Act was implicated."
While Admiral Allen and the NIC are on waiver watch, BP is responsible for marshaling the vessels required for so massive an operation. "We'll let BP decide on what expertise they do need," a State Department spokesman said June 14.
This is the real problem in the Gulf. BP apparently determines what types of vessels are necessary and when and where these vessels are needed -- and some media reports indicate that it is BP, not the Jones Act, that is keeping useful tonnage away.
For example, a June 14 report from the Norway-based shipping publication Trade Winds provided a revealing between-the-lines look at BP in charge. The article said a Belgian dredge company, Jan de Nul, had proposed sending a specialized vessel, the 36,000-deadweight-ton Simon Stevin, to the Gulf. The ship was fitted with equipment that "could have been used to suck up oil from the broken rig riser," the Trade Winds account said.
Trade Winds quoted Jan de Nul spokesperson Ann Keymeulen: "There were two meetings with BP, one early in May and one at the end of the month. We offered to send Simon Stevin but in the end they said no because of the Jones Act and because the vessel was in Singapore. They thought it would take too long to send it over. They said they wanted to use their own equipment."
Trade Winds also quoted Noel Pille, an engineer with Jan de Nul: "The diameter of the pipe on such a ship is much broader than the funnel BP is now using to suck up the oil. That means we can collect more oil, which can be pumped underwater into an oil tanker. Moreover, at the bottom of the fallpipe, there is a type of unmanned submarine, which can perform tasks at great depths. With our assistance, the entire process could have been speeded up greatly."
In this case, BP -- not the Jones Act -- thwarted the use of foreign-flagged tonnage, and Jan de Nul apparently did not ask the Coast Guard, the Maritime Administration or Customs and Border Protection to confirm what BP had said about the Jones Act.
The question, then, is not how many qualified foreign-flagged vessels have been blocked from Gulf of Mexico emergency response service by the Jones Act -- we know the answer, and we know it does not fit the narrative promoted by critics of the domestic shipping law. What the media, members of the House of Representatives and the Senate and public officials in Gulf states must ask is how many suitable foreign-flagged vessels have been blocked by BP.
The truth behind Jones Act controversy in the Gulf
By Tom Bethel
AMO National President
The ferocious flow of toxic crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico from the BP blowout has led to pointless debate over the Jones Act, the 1920 law that reserves all domestic waterborne cargoes for merchant vessels owned, built, flagged and crewed in the U.S.
What does the Jones Act have to do with the Gulf catastrophe? Nothing. But brazen opportunists in the U.S. and abroad see the crisis as an opening, a way to revive long-held hopes of eliminating the law -- in one legislative strike, if possible, or incrementally if necessary -- for narrow professional, financial, political or diplomatic gain. Like the oil surging relentlessly from the ruptured riser at the BP drill site, their message is spreading through inaccurate media reports and misleading commentary.
The issue is whether the Jones Act impedes the emergency response in the Gulf. Jones Act critics say there are too few domestic merchant vessels to do what is required on so large a scale. These critics contend as well that, because of the Jones Act, suitable foreign-flagged vessels offered for specific services are denied entry to the Gulf.
But the facts say that the Jones Act is no hindrance at all.
Under current interpretation of the law by its enforcement authority -- Customs and Border Protection in the Department of Homeland Security -- the Jones Act applies only within three miles of the Gulf coastline.
Jones Act vessels of varied size and configuration are helping to skim and contain the oil within this three-mile zone. "During the current situation in the Gulf of Mexico, U.S.-flagged vessels have been used in every situation where U.S. vessels and crews are available," Maritime Administrator David Matsuda noted June 17 in testimony before the House Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Subcommittee. "Seventy-seven percent of the vessels providing oil spill response in the Gulf are U.S.-flagged."
Waters beyond the three-mile coastal range under Jones Act jurisdiction are wide open -- and several foreign-flagged, built, owned and crewed vessels are providing cleanup and containment services closer to the BP drill site some 50 miles off the Louisiana coast. By July 1, the government had accepted assistance from 12 countries, and offers from a total of 30 countries were under consideration. "To be clear, the acceptance of international assistance we announced today did not mean to imply that international help was arriving only now," a State Department spokesman told reporters June 29. "In fact, before today, there were 24 foreign vessels operating in the region, and nine countries had provided boom, skimmers and other assistance."
While the law provides for Jones Act waivers under specific, orderly procedures when necessary in national emergencies, none of the foreign-flagged vessels underway in or en route to the Gulf were "waived" in by Customs and Border Protection because these vessels are or will be working outside the Jones Act's scope.
In mid-June, U.S. Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen (retired), head of the National Incident Command coordinating the spill response from Louisiana, said emphatically that no Jones Act waivers had been granted at that point because none had been requested. The NIC, he said, was prepared for "accelerated processing" of Jones Act waiver requests if such applications are filed.
"While we have not seen any need to waive the Jones Act as part of this historic response, we continue to prepare for all possible scenarios," Admiral Allen said later. "Should any waivers be needed, we are prepared to process them as quickly as possible to allow vital spill response activities being undertaken by foreign-flagged vessels to continue without delay."
A separate NIC statement said neither the NIC nor any other U.S. authority had "declined to request assistance or accept offers of assistance of foreign vessels that meet an operational need because the Jones Act was implicated."
While Admiral Allen and the NIC are on waiver watch, BP is responsible for marshaling the vessels required for so massive an operation. "We'll let BP decide on what expertise they do need," a State Department spokesman said June 14.
This is the real problem in the Gulf. BP apparently determines what types of vessels are necessary and when and where these vessels are needed -- and some media reports indicate that it is BP, not the Jones Act, that is keeping useful tonnage away.
For example, a June 14 report from the Norway-based shipping publication Trade Winds provided a revealing between-the-lines look at BP in charge. The article said a Belgian dredge company, Jan de Nul, had proposed sending a specialized vessel, the 36,000-deadweight-ton Simon Stevin, to the Gulf. The ship was fitted with equipment that "could have been used to suck up oil from the broken rig riser," the Trade Winds account said.
Trade Winds quoted Jan de Nul spokesperson Ann Keymeulen: "There were two meetings with BP, one early in May and one at the end of the month. We offered to send Simon Stevin but in the end they said no because of the Jones Act and because the vessel was in Singapore. They thought it would take too long to send it over. They said they wanted to use their own equipment."
Trade Winds also quoted Noel Pille, an engineer with Jan de Nul: "The diameter of the pipe on such a ship is much broader than the funnel BP is now using to suck up the oil. That means we can collect more oil, which can be pumped underwater into an oil tanker. Moreover, at the bottom of the fallpipe, there is a type of unmanned submarine, which can perform tasks at great depths. With our assistance, the entire process could have been speeded up greatly."
In this case, BP -- not the Jones Act -- thwarted the use of foreign-flagged tonnage, and Jan de Nul apparently did not ask the Coast Guard, the Maritime Administration or Customs and Border Protection to confirm what BP had said about the Jones Act.
The question, then, is not how many qualified foreign-flagged vessels have been blocked from Gulf of Mexico emergency response service by the Jones Act -- we know the answer, and we know it does not fit the narrative promoted by critics of the domestic shipping law. What the media, members of the House of Representatives and the Senate and public officials in Gulf states must ask is how many suitable foreign-flagged vessels have been blocked by BP.