Posted:
April 28, 2016
This report was submitted by American Maritime Officers National Vice President, Inland Waters, David Weathers, who will also attend the second session of U.S. Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation hearings on the sinking of El Faro. The hearings are currently scheduled for May 16 to 27 in Jacksonville, Fla.
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA (FEBRUARY 16-26, 2016) - Following is a report on the Marine Board of Investigation. Captain Danny Robichaux and myself attended on behalf of AMO.
The Marine Board was made up of mostly USCG, led by Captain Jason Neubauer, Chief of Investigations from USCG HQ. The Board had two USCG attorneys assigned, along with several USCG officers and several civilians - one a lead investigator (this man had investigated Deepwater Horizon), and another, an expert in salvage (who carried multiple degrees in naval architecture to include a doctorate from MIT), who leads the USCG Salvage Engineering Response Team. The Board also included several members from the NTSB investigation - Lead Investigator Tom Roth Rocky sat on the Board every day. Numerous other members of the NTSB investigative team sat on the Board in a rotating fashion, apparently depending on their area of expertise and the witness being questioned.
This cooperation between USCG and NTSB was described as an effort to minimize the overlap between the two agencies' respective investigations - the two investigations are supposedly independent and will issue separate reports. The Marine Board will be held in two parts. The part just completed was only a preliminary investigation into the background of the incident and vessel - there will be a follow-on Board in mid May to investigate the actual incident. With the recent finding of the SVDR (vessel's black box), there will hopefully be a lot more information available about the actual incident.
The Board was open to the public. Several of the families of the AMO El Faro crew members attended for at least some of the proceedings - we were fortunately able to provide some support for these families at a very difficult time. Numerous plaintiffs' attorneys attended as well, in addition to a variety of individuals who had some interest in the event - various marine consultants, and company staff from Crowley (which is headquartered in Jacksonville).
TOTE senior management - Phil Greene Jr. from TOTE Services, Inc. (the TOTE entity that operated the El Faro and with which AMO has contracts), Tim Nolan from TOTE Maritime Puerto Rico (Sea Star Lines until about two weeks before the El Faro incident), and Anthony Chiarello, head of the parent TOTE organization - all attended for most of the Board. TOTE hired numerous attorneys from high profile national firms. K&L Gates and Holland and Knight provided representation for the TOTE company officials and for the TOTE AMO employees who testified; several other law firms assisted in this.
An attorney represented Mrs. Theresa Davidson, wife of Captain Michael Davidson, from Blank Rome. This attorney, who was also trained as a deck officer/naval architect, did a very good job at ensuring that Captain Davidson was not maligned by any of the witnesses.
The Board itself was set up on a dais, with Parties of Interest seated on floor level at either side. Parties of Interest were defined as TOTE, Mrs. Davidson, American Bureau of Shipping, and Herbert Engineering (which did much of the stability calculations/software for the El Faro's stability computer), and were all afforded an opportunity to question witnesses. No questions were entertained from the public attendees.
The Board questioned witnesses continuously for the approximately two-week period from about 0900-1730 or 1800 most days, with a 45-minute lunch period, to include Saturday, Feb. 20. Most of the questioning was verbal, with some small amount of visual presentations to discuss the El Faro's course lines, etc. The original call to the Emergency Call Center by Captain Michael Davidson was played. Captain John Lawrence, TOTE's Designated Person Ashore, described his conversation with Captain Davidson - this was the last time any contact with the El Faro was made. One point made by Captain Lawrence was the calm evidenced by Captain Davidson and Second Mate Danielle Randolph during this last call - there did not sound to be any impression of impending disaster on the vessel, although there was concern.
Numerous facts appear to have been established during the investigation's testimony. A lot of attention was paid to how the vessel's stability was checked by TOTE, Inc. and TOTE Maritime Puerto Rico - approximately three solid days or more spread across numerous witnesses were spent on this topic. GM and GM margin were of great interest - stability calculations were done ashore by the cargo planners, and then double-checked by the ship's staff. The El Faro had been converted from her original Roll-On/Roll-Off cargo capability to be able to load containers as well - there was considerable discussion on the ramifications of this conversion. Comparison of the vessel's loading computer program, Cargomax, with the Stability and Trim Booklet issued when the vessel was new were made, with respect to how these two means of checking stability were used.
The Alternative Compliance Program to substitute for full USCG inspections was reviewed thoroughly - the Board seemed to have some questions regarding the ACP program, but testimony from USCG officers confirmed that the USCG does not have the personnel or expertise to replace the role of the class societies in the ACP and inspection programs. Many questions were asked about the Polish riding gang and their role on the ship.
Another main topic for the Board was the lack of any nautical oversight by TOTE. TOTE does not employ traditional port captains - there seemed to be an underlying concern from the Board about this lack of support. Numerous questions were also asked about TOTE's selection process for the masters for the new LNG-powered Marlin Class vessels, which are replacing El Faro and her sister ship, El Yunque. None of the existing TOTE captains in the Puerto Rico service were selected for the new vessels - to include Captain Michael Davidson.
Weather routing, or lack thereof, was a point the Board discussed at some length, along with what weather information was available when to the vessel's staff. The weather forecasts for Hurricane Joaquin were found to be full of errors - the El Faro's intended route should have put the vessel on the back side of the storm, which was not supposed to develop fully until much later than it actually did.
A small but important point about the open lifeboats on El Faro was made - I would anticipate that the regulations requiring covered boats on new construction may be applied to all vessels at some point in near future.
TOTE representatives established several points through their testimony. The vessel masters have complete authority over routing and schedule - there was no pressure to sail to make a schedule. The company did ask for accurate information on arrival times to schedule shore side labor to load and unload the ship. These points were confirmed by both numerous shore side staff and Captain Earl Loftfield from sister ship El Yunque. The propulsion plant was regarded as reliable, although the boilers were due for some routine maintenance in an upcoming yard period.
Phil Greene Jr., President of TOTE Services, was very complimentary of the AMO and SIU crews on board. He further gave kudos to the respective union training facilities. The Board did have a line of questioning on how much follow on training the vessel officers receive, which Greene put on the union training centers.
Cargo loading and securing were discussed as well with various witnesses. The cargo was always secured for heavy weather as a routine - this way, the shore side labor would never have to return for extra work/time securing if the weather became an issue.
One major point was made regarding the SVDR (black box). The SVDR had been inspected for the Safety Radio Certificate annually - the technician at the most recent El Faro inspection had NOT changed the pinger battery at the inspection - so it was most likely dead and was certainly expired when the vessel sank. This had to increase the difficulty in finding the SVDR on the sea floor to a very high level. Grumman Sperry whose subcontractor did this inspection did not look very good on this topic.
I tracked some of the media coverage regarding the Board. Much of it was written with an eye to good headlines (as much press coverage of anything is) and the accuracy of the facts described varies widely.
One surprise when watching the Board's proceedings was the lack of marine knowledge exhibited by some of the questioning. Some of the board members were very knowledgeable on certain areas, but in terms of awareness of how merchant ships operate, lacked some basic knowledge in areas that were somewhat fundamental. I think this highlights how the USCG has been stretched very thin on a wide variety of missions and stepped away from the marine expertise once held - this service has been asked to do a lot with an ever decreasing level of funding and support.
There was some jockeying between ABS and USCG regarding who was actually responsible for inspection regimes, approvals for changes in vessel construction, etc.
CONCLUSIONS
I would anticipate some changes in regulations and procedures coming out of this Board at some point, possibly years from now after both NTSB and USCG investigations are completed and reports issued.
This is a very brief summary out of the 11 days of testimony and 100-plus pages worth of notes. Please send any further or more specific questions.
USCG Marine Board of Investigation on sinking of El Faro
This report was submitted by American Maritime Officers National Vice President, Inland Waters, David Weathers, who will also attend the second session of U.S. Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation hearings on the sinking of El Faro. The hearings are currently scheduled for May 16 to 27 in Jacksonville, Fla.
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA (FEBRUARY 16-26, 2016) - Following is a report on the Marine Board of Investigation. Captain Danny Robichaux and myself attended on behalf of AMO.
The Marine Board was made up of mostly USCG, led by Captain Jason Neubauer, Chief of Investigations from USCG HQ. The Board had two USCG attorneys assigned, along with several USCG officers and several civilians - one a lead investigator (this man had investigated Deepwater Horizon), and another, an expert in salvage (who carried multiple degrees in naval architecture to include a doctorate from MIT), who leads the USCG Salvage Engineering Response Team. The Board also included several members from the NTSB investigation - Lead Investigator Tom Roth Rocky sat on the Board every day. Numerous other members of the NTSB investigative team sat on the Board in a rotating fashion, apparently depending on their area of expertise and the witness being questioned.
This cooperation between USCG and NTSB was described as an effort to minimize the overlap between the two agencies' respective investigations - the two investigations are supposedly independent and will issue separate reports. The Marine Board will be held in two parts. The part just completed was only a preliminary investigation into the background of the incident and vessel - there will be a follow-on Board in mid May to investigate the actual incident. With the recent finding of the SVDR (vessel's black box), there will hopefully be a lot more information available about the actual incident.
The Board was open to the public. Several of the families of the AMO El Faro crew members attended for at least some of the proceedings - we were fortunately able to provide some support for these families at a very difficult time. Numerous plaintiffs' attorneys attended as well, in addition to a variety of individuals who had some interest in the event - various marine consultants, and company staff from Crowley (which is headquartered in Jacksonville).
TOTE senior management - Phil Greene Jr. from TOTE Services, Inc. (the TOTE entity that operated the El Faro and with which AMO has contracts), Tim Nolan from TOTE Maritime Puerto Rico (Sea Star Lines until about two weeks before the El Faro incident), and Anthony Chiarello, head of the parent TOTE organization - all attended for most of the Board. TOTE hired numerous attorneys from high profile national firms. K&L Gates and Holland and Knight provided representation for the TOTE company officials and for the TOTE AMO employees who testified; several other law firms assisted in this.
An attorney represented Mrs. Theresa Davidson, wife of Captain Michael Davidson, from Blank Rome. This attorney, who was also trained as a deck officer/naval architect, did a very good job at ensuring that Captain Davidson was not maligned by any of the witnesses.
The Board itself was set up on a dais, with Parties of Interest seated on floor level at either side. Parties of Interest were defined as TOTE, Mrs. Davidson, American Bureau of Shipping, and Herbert Engineering (which did much of the stability calculations/software for the El Faro's stability computer), and were all afforded an opportunity to question witnesses. No questions were entertained from the public attendees.
The Board questioned witnesses continuously for the approximately two-week period from about 0900-1730 or 1800 most days, with a 45-minute lunch period, to include Saturday, Feb. 20. Most of the questioning was verbal, with some small amount of visual presentations to discuss the El Faro's course lines, etc. The original call to the Emergency Call Center by Captain Michael Davidson was played. Captain John Lawrence, TOTE's Designated Person Ashore, described his conversation with Captain Davidson - this was the last time any contact with the El Faro was made. One point made by Captain Lawrence was the calm evidenced by Captain Davidson and Second Mate Danielle Randolph during this last call - there did not sound to be any impression of impending disaster on the vessel, although there was concern.
Numerous facts appear to have been established during the investigation's testimony. A lot of attention was paid to how the vessel's stability was checked by TOTE, Inc. and TOTE Maritime Puerto Rico - approximately three solid days or more spread across numerous witnesses were spent on this topic. GM and GM margin were of great interest - stability calculations were done ashore by the cargo planners, and then double-checked by the ship's staff. The El Faro had been converted from her original Roll-On/Roll-Off cargo capability to be able to load containers as well - there was considerable discussion on the ramifications of this conversion. Comparison of the vessel's loading computer program, Cargomax, with the Stability and Trim Booklet issued when the vessel was new were made, with respect to how these two means of checking stability were used.
The Alternative Compliance Program to substitute for full USCG inspections was reviewed thoroughly - the Board seemed to have some questions regarding the ACP program, but testimony from USCG officers confirmed that the USCG does not have the personnel or expertise to replace the role of the class societies in the ACP and inspection programs. Many questions were asked about the Polish riding gang and their role on the ship.
Another main topic for the Board was the lack of any nautical oversight by TOTE. TOTE does not employ traditional port captains - there seemed to be an underlying concern from the Board about this lack of support. Numerous questions were also asked about TOTE's selection process for the masters for the new LNG-powered Marlin Class vessels, which are replacing El Faro and her sister ship, El Yunque. None of the existing TOTE captains in the Puerto Rico service were selected for the new vessels - to include Captain Michael Davidson.
Weather routing, or lack thereof, was a point the Board discussed at some length, along with what weather information was available when to the vessel's staff. The weather forecasts for Hurricane Joaquin were found to be full of errors - the El Faro's intended route should have put the vessel on the back side of the storm, which was not supposed to develop fully until much later than it actually did.
A small but important point about the open lifeboats on El Faro was made - I would anticipate that the regulations requiring covered boats on new construction may be applied to all vessels at some point in near future.
TOTE representatives established several points through their testimony. The vessel masters have complete authority over routing and schedule - there was no pressure to sail to make a schedule. The company did ask for accurate information on arrival times to schedule shore side labor to load and unload the ship. These points were confirmed by both numerous shore side staff and Captain Earl Loftfield from sister ship El Yunque. The propulsion plant was regarded as reliable, although the boilers were due for some routine maintenance in an upcoming yard period.
Phil Greene Jr., President of TOTE Services, was very complimentary of the AMO and SIU crews on board. He further gave kudos to the respective union training facilities. The Board did have a line of questioning on how much follow on training the vessel officers receive, which Greene put on the union training centers.
Cargo loading and securing were discussed as well with various witnesses. The cargo was always secured for heavy weather as a routine - this way, the shore side labor would never have to return for extra work/time securing if the weather became an issue.
One major point was made regarding the SVDR (black box). The SVDR had been inspected for the Safety Radio Certificate annually - the technician at the most recent El Faro inspection had NOT changed the pinger battery at the inspection - so it was most likely dead and was certainly expired when the vessel sank. This had to increase the difficulty in finding the SVDR on the sea floor to a very high level. Grumman Sperry whose subcontractor did this inspection did not look very good on this topic.
I tracked some of the media coverage regarding the Board. Much of it was written with an eye to good headlines (as much press coverage of anything is) and the accuracy of the facts described varies widely.
One surprise when watching the Board's proceedings was the lack of marine knowledge exhibited by some of the questioning. Some of the board members were very knowledgeable on certain areas, but in terms of awareness of how merchant ships operate, lacked some basic knowledge in areas that were somewhat fundamental. I think this highlights how the USCG has been stretched very thin on a wide variety of missions and stepped away from the marine expertise once held - this service has been asked to do a lot with an ever decreasing level of funding and support.
There was some jockeying between ABS and USCG regarding who was actually responsible for inspection regimes, approvals for changes in vessel construction, etc.
CONCLUSIONS
I would anticipate some changes in regulations and procedures coming out of this Board at some point, possibly years from now after both NTSB and USCG investigations are completed and reports issued.
- Increased oversight of inspections by USCG and enhanced oversight of the class societies, who themselves will be stiffening how their inspections are done (This is already happening from empirical reports from AMO vessels and ABS surveyors I have come into contact with on our vessels)
- Increased examination of stability calculations and the underlying assumptions by class societies and USCG
- Enhanced Marine Safety staffing by USCG to support the above
- Further requirements for follow on training for ships' officers - stability and weather may be likely topics
- Review of watertight integrity features on vessels - watertight door sealing and operation, etc.
- Open lifeboats, which were originally recommended to be removed by 1991 after the Marine Electric sinking, will likely be banned at some point in near future
- Use of weather routing services may become mandatory, or at least enhanced weather reporting/information provided to vessels may become a requirement
This is a very brief summary out of the 11 days of testimony and 100-plus pages worth of notes. Please send any further or more specific questions.